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IN DEFENSE OF EMERGENT INDIVIDUALS:  
A REPLY TO MORELAND
Joshua Johnson
J. P. Moreland has recently raised a number of metaphysical objections to 
the theory of Emergent Individuals that is defended by Timothy O’Connor, 
Jonathan Jacobs, and others. Moreland argues that only theism can provide a 
sufficient explanation for human consciousness, and he considers the theory 
of Emergent Individuals to offer a competing naturalistic explanation that 
must be refuted in order for his argument to be successful. Moreland focuses 
his objections on the account of emergence advocated by the defenders of 
the theory, as well as what he considers to be the theory’s problematic com-
mitment to panpsychism and the causal powers metaphysic. I respond to 
Moreland’s objections and argue that they are unsuccessful largely due to his 
misunderstanding of the theory of Emergent Individuals.
Introduction
In his argument that theism provides the best explanation for human con-
sciousness, J. P. Moreland has recently raised a number of metaphysical 
objections to the theory of Emergent Individuals (hereafter EI)1 that is 
primarily defended by Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan Jacobs (as well 
as others).2 These objections can be sorted into three broad categories: (1) 
the EI account of how individuals emerge faces serious problems with 
respect to individual identity and endurance, (2) EI is committed to a ver-
sion of panpsychism that is implausible given the theory’s commitment to 
naturalism, and (3) the account of causal powers employed by EI fails to 
allow for a contingent relationship between the mind and body. I argue 
1J. P. Moreland, “The Argument from Consciousness” in The Blackwell Companion to Nat-
ural Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009). His arguments can also be found in his 2008 book, Consciousness and The Existence of 
God: A Theistic Argument (New York: Routledge). Moreland also raises methodological and 
epistemological objections against EI that I do not address in this paper.
2See O’Connor, Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Freewill (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002); O’Connor and Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals,” The Philosophical Quarterly 53, 
no. 213 (2003), 540–555 and “Emergent Individuals and the Resurrection,” European Journal 
for the Philosophy of Religion 2:2 (2010), 69–88; O’Connor, and Wong, “The Metaphysics of 
Emergence,” Nous 39 (2005), 665–666; and O’Connor and Churchill, “Nonreductive Physi-
calism or Emergent Dualism? The Argument from Mental Causation” in The Waning of 
Materialism, ed. Robert C. Koons and George Bealer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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that Moreland’s objections are unsuccessful largely due to a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the theory that he is criticizing.
Moreland’s objections against EI are constituents of a larger argument 
for the existence of God, an argument for the conclusion that a theistic 
explanation is the only sufficient explanation for human consciousness. 
Hence, Moreland argues that competing “naturalist” accounts of human 
consciousness fail to provide a sufficient explanation, and he considers 
EI (along with Searle’s “Biological Naturalism” and McGinn’s “Mysterian 
Naturalism”) to be one of these unsatisfactory accounts. Moreland takes 
EI to be committed to a position that he calls the “Harmony Thesis”; that 
is, “the emergence of agent-causal power may be plausibly located within 
a widely accepted naturalist ontology, including a physicalist depiction 
of the agent.”3 Thus, given his commitments to the larger argument he 
is defending, Moreland considers it to be important to eliminate EI as a 
viable competitor for explaining human consciousness.
I. The Theory of Emergent Individuals
As will become clear in the second section of this paper, Moreland’s criti-
cisms are of a rather severe misinterpretation of EI. Hence, it is important 
that we first examine the contents of the theory in order to demonstrate 
how it is misinterpreted by Moreland. Before explaining how EI accounts 
for the emergence of individuals, it will be helpful to examine two other 
metaphysical systems to which the theory is committed: the ontology of 
immanent universals and a powers theory of causation.
1.1 The Ontology of Immanent Universals and the Powers Account of Causation
Defenders of EI hold to the ontology of immanent universals that is most 
notably defended by D. M. Armstrong.4 According to Armstrong, all that 
exists are “facts” or “states of affairs” and their constituents.5 A state of 
affairs (SOA) is a thin particular (non-qualitative individuator) and its in-
stanced universal(s) that are non-mereologically composed to form a thick 
particular. Universals are multiply instantiated, which means that the same 
universal F, if instantiated by both a and b, is wholly located in both a and b. 
Neither the thin particular nor the universal can exist on its own, although 
they can be conceptually distinguished. Universals, considered alone, are 
what Armstrong refers to as “states of affairs types” or unsaturated entities.6 
For example, the SOA “a’s being F” may be conceptually abstracted into the 
SOA type of “__’s being F.” There can be no uninstantiated universals and 
universals can exist only as constituents of SOAs. This will be important to 
keep in mind when considering Moreland’s interpretation of EI.
3Moreland, “The Argument from Consciousness,” 312.
4See D. M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge, U.K. and New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1997)
5Ibid., 19
6Ibid., 28–29
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Armstrong holds to a sparse notion of universals and a restriction of 
fundamental particulars to basic physical entities. Indeed, he holds that 
the best candidates for SOAs and natural properties (universals) would 
probably be those physical simples, and their properties, that a future, 
perfected physics demonstrates to be the fundamental constituents of re-
ality. For Armstrong, everything else supervenes upon these fundamental 
entities. According to EI, however, the existence of ontologically emergent 
properties—especially in certain biological organisms—means that, along 
with the fundamental physical entities, persons exist as emergent indi-
viduals with their own particularity and emergent mentality.
Besides being committed to the framework of immanent universals, EI 
is also committed to a particular sort of realism with respect to causation, 
namely the “powers” theory of causation. Rather than regarding causation 
as mere counterfactual dependence (as Lewis does) or as nomic necessita-
tion (as Armstrong does), the advocates of the powers theory hold that 
causation is the manifestation of the powerful qualities of particulars.7 
With respect to the theory of emergence advocated by EI, physical simples 
are disposed, in the proper circumstances, to cause the existence of on-
tologically independent emergent properties. These emergent properties 
also have dispositions, among which is the tendency to cause the existence 
of further emergent properties.8
1.2 The Emergence of Individuals
Now that we have established the basic metaphysical background to EI, 
we may examine how the theory explains the emergence of individuals. 
According to EI, when fundamental physical simples reach a certain 
threshold of structural complexity, an emergent individual is brought into 
existence along with its own unique emergent properties. It is important 
not to view the use of “emergence” here as being merely epistemological. 
It is also important not to view the emergent person and properties as 
being nothing over and above the mere structure of the physical simples. 
Rather, the person and her properties both exemplify genuine ontological 
emergence. Defenders of EI hold that emergent individuals and their 
properties are as ontologically “basic as electric charge now appears to be, 
just more restricted in the circumstances of their manifestation.”9
Each physical simple that contributes to the emergent individual is 
itself a non-mereologically composed SOA (or simply, “individual,” as 
7There is some debate as to whether these are pure powers, the powers of properties, or 
powerful qualities (or quiddities). At least one of the defenders of EI holds to the latter view. 
For a defense of this account of powers causation see Jacobs’s “Powerful Qualities, Not Pure 
Powers,” The Monist 94:1 (2011), 81–102.
8See O’Connor and Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals,” and “Emergent Individuals and the 
Resurrection,” as well as O’Connor and Wong, “The Metaphysics of Emergence.” It should 
be noted that this disposition may be deterministic or indeterministic.
9O’Connor and Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals,” 54.
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defenders of EI prefer).10 These entities each possess a disposition to cause 
the existence of emergent properties when they are arranged in a particular 
way. An emergent individual also possesses “a distinctive particularity 
and distinctive fundamental properties” and, thus, the ontology em-
ployed by defenders of EI “has two basic sorts of genuine objects: simples, 
and emergent composites.”11 While the emergent person, like ontological 
simples, possesses non-mereological structure in that she is an individual 
that instantiates universals, what makes these individuals unique is that 
they are also mereologically composed of the physical simples that cause 
the emergent individual to exist. Thus emergent individuals have both 
mereological parts (the simples of which they are physically composed) 
and non-mereological parts (a particularity and universals of which they 
are ontologically composed). After the emergent individual is brought 
into existence, its emergent and basal properties engage in an incredibly 
complex set of causal relations that include the causing of new emergent 
properties.12
For a more formal statement of the central thesis of EI, consider the 
following:
Emergent Individual: There is a thing x that has simples as mereolog-
ical parts and there is a thing y that has non-mereological parts (a thin 
particular and emergent properties), and x = y.
Now that we have a reasonably clear understanding of EI, we may pro-
ceed to examine and reply to Moreland’s objections to the theory.
II. Moreland’s Objections Stated and Examined
2.1 Problems with the EI Description of the Agent
Moreland provides a number of objections against EI’s account of emer-
gent individuals:
a. The agent described by the theory is not a purely physical particular.
b. There is no baseline conscious state that is apt for grounding the 
endurance of the individual.
c. EI implausibly requires that the thinker is dependent on thinking.
d. EI’s account of diachronic causation entails that the “very first men-
tal state” of an individual’s life is ownerless.
10Since the term SOA tends to be more associated with Armstrong and his strict natu-
ralism.
11“For unlike other complex ‘objects’ recognized only as a courtesy, an emergent entity 
has a distinctive particularity and distinctive fundamental properties. This ontology has two 
basic sorts of genuine objects: simples, and emergent composites.” O’Connor and Jacobs, 
“Emergent Individuals,” 548.
12See O’Connor and Wong, “The Metaphysics of Emergence,” 665–668 for an account of 
this.
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In order to properly understand these objections, it is important to under-
stand how Moreland interprets EI. First, as stated above, Moreland claims 
that EI is committed to the “Harmony Thesis.” That is, EI is compatible 
with naturalism and the agent that it describes is a physical substance. 
Second, while Moreland is largely correct in his description of EI with 
respect to its incorporation of the ontology of immanent universals and a 
powers account of causation, he unfortunately misinterprets the theory’s 
account of emergence. According to Moreland’s description of the theory, 
holistic mental states emerge when underlying physical particles reach a 
specific threshold of structural complexity. These emergent mental states, 
in turn, bring an individual agent into existence as a new particularity in 
a process that Moreland refers to as “composition-conferred-by-holism”:
[S]ubvenient entities are always trying to bring about the emergent indi-
vidual, but it is only when a certain threshold level of complexity is reached 
that conditions are right for that base to cause the emergent individual to 
come into being. When emergent mental properties appear, they constitute 
holistic mental states—perhaps enduring baseline mental states—and these 
in, in turn, confer on persons their substantial unity as thinking biological 
substances, presumably by bringing about through top/down causation a 
new particularity over and above that of the series of subvenient mereo-
logical aggregates that are in a constant state of flux. This “composition-con-
ferred-by-holism” view produces an emergent individual that is somehow 
composed by its parts but has a new thisness all its own.13
Moreland’s claim that emergent mental states diachronically cause the 
existence of a new particularity is due to a crucial misinterpretation of 
EI, and it is the basis for his objections, b–d, listed above. In fairness to 
Moreland, he appears to be basing his interpretation of EI from the fol-
lowing passages found in O’Connor and Jacobs (2003) and O’Connor and 
Wong (2005) respectively:
Turning now to persons, their holistic mental states (or perhaps certain en-
during “baseline” states in particular) confer on them a substantial unity as 
thinking biological substances, requiring one to treat persons as wholes in 
any adequate characterization of the dynamics of the world.14
Emergent properties are basic properties, token-distinct in character and 
propensity from any microphysically structured properties of their bearers. 
If their appearance in certain systems is to be explained at all, they must be 
explained in terms of a causal, not purely formal, relationship to underlying, 
immediately preceding structures.15
As for the first passage, it appears that Moreland understands the phrase 
“mental states confer on them a substantial unity” as “mental states cause 
a new particularity”; however, this reading of O’Connor and Jacobs is 
13Moreland, “The Argument from Consciousness,” 316.
14O’Connor and Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals,” 548 (emphasis mine).
15O’Connor and Wong, “The Metaphysics of Emergence,” 664.
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not what the authors intend, since immediately following the above pas-
sage, they are careful to point out that this “functional unity does not 
itself constitute a particularity as an enduring thing, but it plausibly implies 
it.”16 That is, O’Connor and Jacobs regard the presence of a substantial or 
functional unity as a clear indicator that a composite entity possesses its 
own particularity, and that entities that possess ontologically emergent 
mental properties are “natural candidates” for the sorts of things that ex-
hibit such unity.17 They are not claiming that emergent mental states cause 
particularities. With respect to the above passage from O’Connor and 
Wong (2005), the causal relationship that they describe is diachronic cau-
sation between physical properties and emergent mental properties, and 
not one in which emergent mental properties cause new, non-qualitative 
particularities.18
Finally, although we have seen that there are places in which the advo-
cates of EI might be misunderstood, it is important to highlight the fact 
that Moreland’s interpretation of EI cannot be correct given the ontology 
endorsed by the defenders of the theory. Remember that, according to 
the Armstrongian ontology endorsed by EI, universals when considered 
apart from particulars are mere “SOA types” and not actual SOAs. Given 
this, universals can exist only as constituents of SOAs. Yet Moreland’s in-
terpretation has the emergent mental properties of the individual existing 
temporally prior to the existence of the individual since he thinks that the 
emergent properties are causally responsible for bringing the individual 
into existence.19 But if the emergent states of the individual exist tempo-
rally prior to the existence individual, then these universals must exist 
separate from the individual. Given the ontology of universals employed 
by advocates of EI, this cannot be correct since this theory explicitly states 
that universals can exist only as constituents of SOAs (which requires that 
they exist along with a particular and not prior to it). Thus, Moreland is 
attributing a position to the defenders of EI that they cannot hold given 
their ontological commitments.
2.1a. The agent is not a purely physical particular
We can now proceed to explaining and replying to Moreland’s objections to 
EI. Moreland believes that EI fails in its commitment to the Harmony Thesis 
partly because the emergent agent that it describes is not a purely physical 
particular. Remember that a portion of Moreland’s Argument from Con-
sciousness is devoted to disqualifying competing naturalist explanations of 
human consciousness. Thus, if he can show that the EI is not compatible 
16O’Connor and Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals,” 548 (emphasis mine).
17Ibid., 547.
18The same can be said for the diagram that appears on p. 666 of O’Connor and Wong, 
“The Metaphysics of Emergence.”
19Indeed, as we shall see in sections 1.1b, c, and d below, Moreland is quite explicit about 
this. 
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with naturalism, then that theory cannot qualify as a naturalistic explana-
tion of consciousness. I will bracket these concerns about the Harmony 
Thesis for now, and simply explain why Moreland thinks that EI is mistaken 
in claiming that the individual that it describes is a physical being.
According to Moreland, the agent described by EI—when described 
qua agent—is essentially mental in nature; however, when the agent is 
described from the perspective of a naturalistic ontology, it is described 
as a physical system or substance.20 Moreover, Moreland expresses strong 
skepticism as to whether any substance with essential mental properties 
can be considered a physical substance:
It is not clear how [O’Connor] can hold that the agent self is a physical sub-
stance necessarily characterized by emergent mental properties. If the agent 
self is essentially mental, and if we recognize that a particular’s actual and 
potential properties are both relevant for characterizing the kind of entity 
the particular is, then the agent self would seem to be essentially a men-
tal/ physical particular, and not simply a physical particular with emergent 
mental properties attached to it.21
It is difficult to know what to make of this objection. O’Connor and Jacobs 
freely admit that they are offering a “qualified” form of the thesis that 
persons are material substances.22 Further, defenders of EI are neither 
committed to a strong notion of physicalism nor do they wish to be.23 Fi-
nally, there is some debate over how to define the term “physicalism” or 
what exactly constitutes a physical object. For example, Andrew Melnyk’s 
realization physicalism is a version of physicalism in which every prop-
erty is either physical or physically realized (brought about by a physical 
property), and this account of physicalism appears to be consistent with 
the emergent entities described by EI:
But if current physics is construed broadly, as I have proposed, then even if 
some branches of physics do turn out to deal with phenomena that are emer-
gent in the relevantly strong sense, realization physicalism will not have 
been refuted; for the strongly emergent phenomena will in that case count 
as physical in their own right.24
However one understands physicalism, it is important to keep in mind 
that EI does endorse the notion that human persons are physical systems 
that have fundamental emergent properties. Whether or not such persons 
are “purely physical particulars” largely depends upon what one means 
by “purely” and “physical.” Moreland believes that the only way that one 
20Moreland, “The Argument from Consciousness,” 314. In a related note, Moreland ar-
gues along with Galen Strawson that free agency intuitively requires a mental subject (see 
Strawson, Freedom and Belief [Oxford: Clarendon Press.Strawson, 1986]).
21Ibid, 315
22O’Connor and Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals,” 540.
23O’Connor asserted this in conversation.
24Andrew Melnyk, A Physicalist Manifesto (Cambridge, U.K. and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 16.
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can be a consistent naturalist is to hold to a version of physicalism that 
does not allow for the existence of ontologically emergent properties.25 
Thus, his objection to EI is that it fails as a naturalistic explanation for 
human consciousness since it does not endorse strict physicalism. Again, 
it seems that defenders of EI can simply reply that, if this is the notion of 
naturalism that Moreland insists upon, then EI is not consistent with it 
(nor would defenders of EI wish their theory to be consistent with such 
a strong form of naturalism). Of course, Moreland thinks that the only 
viable form of naturalism is strong naturalism, and we shall examine this 
claim in more detail in sec. 2.2 below.
2.1b. There is no baseline conscious state to ground the endurance of the 
individual
Moreland thinks that, given his “composition-conferred-by-holism” 
interpretation of EI, it appears that there can be no basis for individual 
endurance through time, since he believes that emergent conscious mental 
states exist temporally prior to the particular individual which they cause 
to exist. Since conscious mental states are in perpetual flux, there appears 
to be no enduring, baseline conscious state to confer individual existence 
over time.26 Moreover, given his account of how the emergent individual 
is caused to exist along with EI’s commitment to diachronic causation 
between physical states and emergent states, Moreland claims that EI im-
plies that new emergent individuals are continually coming into existence 
over time. Here is how Moreland states the objection:
Beyond the very first conscious state, the following would seem to hold: for 
all CN+1 (for N greater than zero) at tN+2, the individual IN+1 conferred by and, 
thus, ontologically tied to CN+1 exists at tN+2. I see no further relevant onto-
logical relationship between a conscious state and an emergent individual 
other than the conferral relation. If this is correct, then it is hard to see how 
a continuing ‘‘self’’ can exist since there just is no single, ongoing ‘‘baseline 
mental state’’ throughout one’s life (e.g. in sleep or surgery). Since conscious 
states are in flux, so are the instantaneous individuals upon whom they con-
fer existence. In this case, for any time t greater than one, there may be an 
emergent individual that exists while a particular conscious state obtains, 
but it is the wrong one.27
I concede that the above would be quite damaging to EI if this were what 
the theory actually implied. However, as we have seen, EI does not rec-
ognize the “conferral relation” mentioned by Moreland as being a causal 
relation, and thus it does not entail that emergent mental states are con-
stantly bringing about the existence of new individuals.
25Moreland, “The Argument from Consciousness,” 286–294.
26Moreland says that this is due to the fact that EI holds that the causal relation between 
basal and emergent states is diachronic. See O’Connor and Wong, “The Metaphysics of Emer-
gence,” for an account of this.
27Moreland, “The Argument from Consciousness,” 317.
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2.1c–d. EI entails “ownerless” mental states and thinkers being 
dependent on thinking.
The following objections are both closely related to 2.1b given above; in-
deed, both of them may simply be considered different ways of framing 
b. Given the “composition-conferred-by-holism” interpretation of EI, 
emergent mental states bring about the existence of particular individuals 
via “top/down” causation and therefore exist temporally prior to the par-
ticular individuals. Thus the very first mental state of a person would be 
ownerless. Moreover, this ownerless objection implies that EI is mistaken 
with respect to the ontological priority of the mind and its mental states; 
thus, “thinking” exists before the individual thinker does. Moreland thinks 
that the priority is wrong here. I agree and so can the representative of EI, 
because the above is based on a mistaken interpretation of the theory.
2.2 Panpsychism, Naturalism, and EI
Recall that Moreland’s “Argument from Consciousness” attempts to show 
that only theism can explain the existence of human consciousness and 
that competing naturalistic explanations are unsuccessful. Also, recall 
that Moreland argues that EI is committed to the “Harmony Thesis”; 
that is, its account of emergent individuals is compatible with a natural-
istic worldview along with physicalism. Given the above, if Moreland 
can demonstrate that EI is incompatible with naturalism, then EI can no 
longer be regarded as a competing naturalistic account of consciousness. 
One way that Moreland thinks that this can be done is by pointing out the 
fact that EI is committed to panpsychism (which Moreland considers to be 
opposed to naturalism).
There are a number of questionable assumptions in the above line of 
reasoning which I shall address a little later on, but first, let us determine 
in what sense Moreland thinks that EI entails panpsychism. Generally 
speaking, “panpsychism” is the view that mind is everywhere. Hence, 
advocates of panpsychism hold that everything (or at least mostly every-
thing) is conscious to some degree or another. Complex organisms like 
human beings have a much richer conscious experience than fundamental 
particles, but the latter are still “barely” conscious. None of this is entailed 
by EI, and Moreland apparently recognizes this by attributing a form of 
“weak panpsychism” to the theory.
But what is weak panpsychism? Moreland borrows the term from 
Colin McGinn who describes it as physical things having a sort of “proto- 
mentality”:
We can hardly suppose that rocks are (sometimes? always?) in mild pain and 
thinking hazily about dinner, while we feel intense pain and have sharply 
focused thoughts. No, the idea must be that rocks have what are sometimes 
called protomental states, states that can yield conscious states while not 
themselves being conscious states. . . . A protomental property is defined as 
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one that is capable of giving rise to mental properties without being actually 
mental—fully, properly, literally.28
Given the above description, it does appear that EI would be classified as a 
form of weak panpsychism (although it is doubtful that EI would attribute 
protomental states to a rock). In various publications, defenders of the 
theory have made such claims as “emergent [mental] features are as basic 
as electric charge now appears to be”29 and “the presence of agent-causal 
capacities in select complex entities has always been among the potentiali-
ties of the world’s primordial building blocks.”30 And, as noted in sec. 1.2 
above, EI holds that the fundamental physical entities that give rise to the 
emergent individual do so by virtue of certain causal dispositions intrinsic 
to them. Thus it appears there is a sense in which basic physical entities 
possess protomentality.
Moreland describes positions like the one characterized above as “hard 
sayings” for naturalists and that the weak panpsychism entailed by EI is 
“closer to theism than to naturalism.”31 As for the former concern, it seems 
that the force of the objection would depend largely upon what one means 
by “naturalism”; with respect to the latter statement, one would think that 
those defenders of EI who are theists would be puzzled as to the force of 
such an accusation.32 This leads us, once again, to Moreland’s insistence on 
EI’s commitment to the “Harmony Thesis.”
At the beginning of his article, Moreland goes to great lengths to 
establish the fact that “strong naturalism” is the only plausible form of nat-
uralism that can be endorsed by someone committed to naturalism. Strong 
naturalism, as opposed to the weaker version, endorses “a strict version of 
physicalism” that holds that everything that exists is entirely physical and, 
thus, rules out emergent entities (including entities brought into existence 
by the protomental dispositions of physical entities).33 Moreland thinks 
that strong naturalism may permit what he refers to as “Emergence0” and 
“Emergence1” (where the former refers to features that may be deduced 
from a subvenient base and the latter refers to ordinary structural proper-
ties), but holds that “there is an increasingly heavy burden of proof on a 
naturalist ontology” that posits progressively higher forms of emergence 
28Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World (Basic Books, 
1999).
29O’Connor and Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals,” 541.
30Timothy O’Connor, “Causality, Mind, and Freewill” in Soul, Body, and Survival, ed. 
Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 58.
31Moreland, “The Argument from Consciousness,” 316, 318. It should be noted that there 
is at least one other well-regarded philosopher (David Chalmers) who claims both a commit-
ment to naturalism and a marked sympathy for some form of panpsychism (The Conscious 
Mind [New York: Oxford University Press, 1996], 293–299)
32O’Connor related to me in conversation that, if EI is to be regarded as a naturalistic 
theory, it could only be so in a restricted sense due to his commitment to theism.
33Moreland, “The Argument from Consciousness,” 286.
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(ranging from sui generis epiphenomenal properties to emergent souls).34 
Moreland holds that this “burden of proof” arises from the “location 
problem” of naturalism expounded by Frank Jackson.35 Moreland explains 
the location problem as stating that problematic entities (like emergent 
mental properties) must either be located in a physicalist description of 
the world or eliminated. An example he provides (following Jackson) is 
the property of macrosolidity which can be wholly explained by simply 
describing the atomic structure of a macrowhole.36 On the other hand, the 
emergent properties brought about by the weak panpsychism espoused 
by EI are “completely unique” and “intrinsically characterizeable, novel 
propert[ies] different from and not composed of the parts, properties, rela-
tions, and events at the subvenient level.”37 Thus these emergent properties 
cannot be located in a strong naturalist ontology and EI fails to deliver on 
the Harmony Thesis.38
What is the defender of EI to make of all of this? I believe that at least 
two responses are in order. First, it is not clear that EI is as committed to 
the Harmony Thesis as Moreland claims (especially given his insistence 
on the ontology of strong naturalism). While it is true that defenders of EI 
are puzzled by accusations that the theory “blatantly contradicts ‘the sci-
entific facts’”39 and that they seek to defend the theory from such charges, 
I can find no place in the literature in which EI is explicitly said to be 
committed to a naturalist ontology. Indeed, at least some of the defenders 
of EI acknowledge that the theory is consistent with the notion that God is 
uniquely involved with the creation of individual human persons.40 More-
over, advocates of EI are critical of the theories that result from a strong 
naturalist ontology (along with rejecting a number of the principles that 
the ontology entails).41
This leads to my second response. The consensus concerning naturalism 
and the emerging scientific picture of the world that Moreland appeals 
34Ibid., 290.
35Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1998), 1–5.
36Moreland, “The Argument from Consciousness,” 286.
37Ibid., 288.
38Moreland also holds that a strong naturalist ontology requires the causal closure of the 
physical (which is another principle denied by EI).
39Timothy O’Connor, Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Freewill (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2002), 108.
40O’Connor and Jacobs, “Emergent Individuals and the Resurrection,” 87n.
41“There is, then, positive evidence that strongly favors a dualist direction at least as strong 
as the emergentist property dualism envisioned here. All evidence is defeasible, of course, 
and some will contend that the whole conception of mind on which this is based, deeply 
entrenched as it is, is but an illusion which must give way to reductive, third-person theories. 
To that we say: believe it if you can. And do not neglect to develop an epistemology—anti-
skeptical, lest you saw off the limb on which you stand!—that shows how our ordinary 
empirical knowledge may comfortably rest on a radical and pervasive cognitive illusion at 
its very source.” O’Connor and Wong, “The Metaphysics of Emergence,” 674.
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to is far from general. Indeed, there are a number of well-respected phi-
losophers who have advocated a revolutionary revision of fundamental 
physics in order to accommodate the phenomena of consciousness.42 
Thus it does not appear that Moreland’s claim that strong naturalism is 
the only viable option for the would-be naturalist is substantiated. In the 
end, defenders of EI can simply reply that, if a commitment to naturalism 
requires a commitment to strong naturalism, then so much the worse for 
naturalism. Hence I consider Moreland’s objections stemming from the 
Harmony Thesis to be irrelevant.
2.3 EI and Causal Necessitation
A final objection that I will consider here is that the account of causal powers 
endorsed by EI does not allow for what appears to be a plausible contingent 
relationship between the mind and body. Unfortunately, Moreland couches 
much of this objection within the context of the Harmony Thesis, and in the 
light of what has already been said about this above, I will simply choose to 
focus upon Moreland’s metaphysical objections to EI’s account of causation 
and forego any more talk about the Harmony Thesis.
As noted in section 1.1 above, EI is committed to a theory of causal 
realism often referred to as the “powers” theory of causation. According 
to this view, causation is the manifestation of certain dispositions intrinsic 
to the nature of substances. A common illustration is that part of the na-
ture of salt is “solubility,” and that this power is manifested when salt is 
placed in the proper circumstance (being immersed in water).43 Within the 
context of EI, fundamental physical particles have, as a part of their na-
ture, the tendency to cause the existence of ontologically emergent mental 
properties when a certain threshold of structural complexity is achieved. 
Thus there is some sense of a necessary connection between underlying 
physical entities and the emergent properties to which they give rise.
It is this necessary connection between the base properties and emer-
gent properties to which Moreland objects:
Since an emergent property is the actualization of causal potentialities in the 
right circumstances, the emergent property seems to be a part of its causal 
property’s identity as well. Thus, an emergent property seems to require its 
base property to exist.44
42See Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Oxford University Press, 1996); Searle, The Redis-
covery of the Mind (MIT Press, 1992); Strawson, “Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism,” in 
Consciousness and Its Place in Nature, ed. Galen Strawson (Exeter, U.K. and Charlottesville, 
VA: Imprint Academic, 2006); and Nagel, Mind and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 1986) 
for just a few examples of philosophers who—along with a commitment to naturalism—ei-
ther explicitly endorse or at least allude to a need for a revolutionary revision of fundamental 
physics.
43Although it should be noted that many powers theorists would not actually agree that 
the “solubility” of salt is a fundamental property of the world.
44Moreland, “The Argument from Consciousness,” 320. One minor quibble here; Searle’s 
Chinese Room thought experiment is an objection to the notion that the brain is nothing 
more than a digital computer. The Chinese Room is not an objection to the necessary con-
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Unfortunately . . . the link between mental properties and the relevant phys-
ical circumstances seems utterly contingent. Grounded in strong conceiv-
ability, thought experiments that provide strong justification for this claim 
proliferate throughout the literature. For example, inverted qualia and Chi-
nese Room scenarios seem to be coherent and entirely possible. No strictly 
physical proposition of [naturalism] employing solely physical terms for 
particulars, properties, relations, or laws renders these thought experiments 
broadly logically impossible, even in worlds that resemble ours in every 
physical respect.45
Moreland’s objection is that the relation between the mind and the body (or 
brain) is contingent and not necessary. Thus EI, with its necessary relation 
between the physical and the mental, cannot be correct. In responding to this 
concern, it might be helpful to begin by clarifying the notion of necessity in 
play here. It appears that Moreland holds EI to entail that specific physical 
states cause specific emergent states necessarily.46 Defenders of EI, however, 
would simply deny this claim. Given indeterminism, there is an objective 
probability that a physical state will not cause the existence of an emergent 
state. Moreover, an indeterministic physical state might bring about the 
existence of one of two different emergent states, and “[i]n such a case, it is 
possible for there to be two physically and nomically indiscernible worlds 
which nonetheless differ with respect to their emergent properties.”47
But perhaps there is another way to frame Moreland’s objection (at least 
with respect to the problem of inverted qualia). Suppose that there is a 
physical entity B whose nature is to be disposed to bring about only the ex-
perience of a certain shade of blue to the subject.48 Given the essentialism 
of causal powers, could B have been disposed to bring about the qualita-
tive experience of red in another world? It seems that the causal powers 
theorist would have to reject this possibility given the nature of the entity 
in question. Given this extremely simple scenario, perhaps we can get a 
feel for Moreland’s concern.49 Couldn’t we at least conceive of a world in 
which B causes the experience of redness rather than blueness?
Moreland appears to be leaning heavily on the notion of strong con-
ceivability with respect to these concerns. But is there any good reason 
to think that conceivability entails possibility? One problem here is that 
just because we think that we can imagine something does not mean that 
nection between the body and the mind. It is not clear to me why Moreland pairs it with the 
inverted qualia thought experiment.
45Ibid., 320.
46“Since most philosophers identify the supervenience relation with the causal relation in 
the case of emergent properties, it is in this causal sense that in the right circumstances, the 
instantiation of a subvenient property necessitates the instantiation of its associated emer-
gent property.” Moreland, “The Argument from Consciousness,” 320.
47O’Connor and Wong, “The Metaphysics of Emergence,” 668.
48I realize that defenders of EI would probably reject the idea that a single physical entity 
is causally responsible for a specific emergent qualitative experience. I am merely using this 
radically simplified scenario to try to get at what Moreland is thinking here.
49This is a rather common objection to neo-Aristotelian essentialism and causal powers.
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we actually can. For example, in one of the Star Trek movies (The Voyage 
Home), some of the crew of the Enterprise are trapped in the past and in 
desperate need of some plexiglass. Since the crew has no money, chief 
engineer Scott trades the design schematics of transparent aluminum (a 
metal from the future) for the desired plexiglass. The actual possibility 
of the existence of transparent aluminum is lost in some comedic banter 
about the dangers of disturbing the past. But is this really possible? Can 
we actually conceive of transparent aluminum or do we merely think that 
we can? The answer to this question isn’t obvious.50 Moreover, even if such 
a thing is conceivable, it is not clear that this entails its possibility.51 Thus, 
given the workings of EI in an indeterministic world, as well as the ques-
tionable status of strong conceivability, I find Moreland’s objections to EI’s 
account of causation to be weak at best.
III. Conclusion
As I hope to have demonstrated above, many of Moreland’s objections to 
EI are unsuccessful due to his misinterpretation of the theory. EI is not the 
thesis that individuals are brought into existence by previously existing 
emergent properties. Rather, EI holds that individuals—having both 
mereological and non-mereological parts—are brought into existence 
when fundamental physical simples reach a threshold level of structural 
complexity. This means that, contrary to Moreland’s objections, emergent 
individuals are not dependent upon temporally prior emergent properties 
for their identity or existence; neither are there new emergent individuals 
constantly being brought into existence via diachronic causation. Rather, 
EI entails that the emergent individual endures due to its own thisness 
that is part of its non-mereological structure.
Hence the theory of emergence criticized by Moreland is not the one 
espoused by EI, his concerns about EI’s weak panpsychism and commit-
ment to the Harmony Thesis are unsubstantiated, and his objections to the 
causal powers theory endorsed by EI don’t take into consideration what 
the defenders of the theory have to say about the implications of indeter-
minism. Moreover, at least some of the defenders of EI are in considerable 
agreement with many of Moreland’s basic assumptions about human per-
sons, agent causal power, and the existence of God. Thus, it would seem 
that Moreland, in misunderstanding the theory at which he has taken aim, 
may be guilty of a bit of friendly fire.52
Saint Louis University
50This is a different version of an original thought experiment of Peter van Inwagen’s in 
his “Modal Epistemology,” Philosophical Studies 92:2 (1998), 67–84.
51For an interesting account of modality within the framework of a causal powers theory 
see Jonathan Jacobs’s “A Powers Theory of Modality,” Philosophical Studies 151:2 (2010), 
227–248.
52Special thanks are due to Jonathan Jacobs and Robert Hartman for their helpful feed-
back on an earlier draft of this paper.
